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SETTLER POLITICS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: 
THE CASE OF SINOE COUNTY, LIBERIA* 
By Jo Sullivan 
To understand events on the Kru Coast in the late nineteenth century, ii: 
is necessary to examine the internal politics of the Sinoe settler community. 
Liberian settlers did not have uniform motives and goals in their relations 
with one another or with indigenous groups and Sinoe County provides a 
clearcut example of the complexity of Liberian settler politics. 1 An 
examination of politics in Sinoe shows internal divisions and alliances as 
well as strain in Sinoe's relationship to the central government, controlled 
by Monrovia settlers. This strain is particularly evident in the Sinoe 
settlers' relations with the peoples of the Kru Coast. Sinoe settler presence 
and interests complicated and often hindered national policy toward the Kru 
Coast. 2 
Compared with immigrants elsewhere in Liberia, the Sinoe settlers were at 
a great disadvantage. The Sinoe settlement was the smallest colony, the most 
underfinanced, and remains today the least developed of the coastal counties. 
In comparison with other settlements, Sinoe was very small. The Missis-
sippi State Colonization Society established the Sinoe settlement of 
Mississippi in Africa in 1838 with the arrival of thirty-eight immigrants from 
the Natchez area of Mississippi. The Monrovia settlement began in 1822, 
*The data for this article were collected in Liberia, 
Great Britain, and the United States from 1974 to 1976 
with assistance from the African Studies Center at Boston 
University. An earlier version of this article was 
presented at the Tenth Annual Liberian Studies Conference 
at Boston University, April 8, 1978. 
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Maryland in Africa at Cape Palmas in 1831, and Bassa Cove in 1834. According 
to the 1843 census, in that year there were 1841 people in Montserrado, 468 in 
the area around Bassa Cove, and seventy-nine at Greenville Sinoe. 3 
Although 240 people arrived in Sinoe between 1843 and 1845, the numbers never 
came close to the other Afro-American settlements. Comparisons with Kru 
neighbors were equally disparate. Estimates during the nineteenth century for 
the many Kru towns on the coast varied from 5,000 to 20,000 people. Although 
the latter is probably an overestimate, it is evident that the Sinoe settlers 
were vastly outnumbered. 
The Sinoe settlers were divided among themselves throughout most of the 
nineteenth century; this prevented them from solving actual and potential 
conflicts with the Kru. The reasons for the divisions among the settlers were 
primarily economic. With little capital and too few people, agriculture never 
expanded. Settler interest in commerce was thwarted by the Kru-British 
control of trade on the coast and German and Dutch control of retail trade in 
Greenville. Compared to immigrants elsewhere in Liberia, the Sinoe settlers 
were less successful at farming and commerce. From a national perspective, 
the small Greenville community could not compete with Monrovia as a central 
place. 
Monrovia. 
Economic and political power, among the settlers, centered in 
Consequently, the Sinoe settlers competed fiercely for the few 
government jobs, although low in pay, in order to gain control of the meager 
revenue from customs and taxes. 
Sinoe resentment of Monrovia resulted in tension in their relations. 
Small numbers and distance kept Sinoe in the shadow of Monrovia. Sinoe had 
begun as a separate colony and resented Monrovia's control, control which was 
not accompanied by financial or immigration assistance. As Liberia developed, 
Monrovia's position of power increased. Monrovia politicians, especially 
presidents, had a more national and integrated view of Liberia and its 
problems. Liberian presidents sought to maintain Liberia's integrity by 
3 
encouraging the incorporation of indigenous groups by granting them political 
rights, ports of entry, and the vote. Sinoe settlers promoted their own 
interests to insure their survival. They opposed any concessions to the Kru, 
defied presidential orders, and insisted on non-interfernce by the presidents 
in their affairs. The Kru had the advantage. If the settlers let them vote 
or become part of the social and political structure, the settlers feared that 
the Kru would take over. Settlers in Sinoe, as in Maryland County, were more 
disadvantaged economically vis-a-vis Africans, than settlers elsewhere in 
Liberia, so they sought to dominate the Kru through political repression. The 
settlers asserted their autonomy at the expense of the Kru and sometimes at 
the expense of the national government. Relations between Monrovia and Sinoe 
were consistently strained. 
The Afro-Americans who settled on the Kru Coast were rarely unified and 
were noted, within the Liberian community, for their preoccupation with 
internal political competition. Small numbers, poverty, distance from the 
political and commercial center of Monrovia, and competition from prosperous 
Kru neighbors caused the settlers to fight among themselves. Keen competition 
for political office and charges of corruption were characteristic of the 
Sinoe immigrants. This competition was significant not only because of its 
intensity, but because it aggravated the settlers' relations with the national 
government and with the Kru. 
The Sinoe settler community, the smallest in Liberia, was always divided. 
Dissatisfaction with local officials and fierce political competition began in 
the 1840s and continued to characterize Sinoe politics until the twentieth 
century. The marginal economic situation in Liberia in general and Sinoe in 
particular created the competitive climate there. Preoccupied with their own 
divisions, the settlers could not resolve their difficulties with the Kru; on 
occasion, Sinoe politics caused incidents of hostility between the settlers 
and Kru or exacerbated relations between them. In-fighting and frequent calls 
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for the removal of officers caused problems between Sinoe and the Monrovia 
government. Liberian presidents, trying to limit African revolts and to keep 
Europeans from taking Liberian territory, repeatedly urged the Sinoe settlers 
to end their differences.4 
Political differences and competition existed from the first days of the 
settlement. Because of the increase in the sheer amount of sources for the 
second half of the nineteenth century, it cannot be concluded that the amount 
or intensity of internal conflict increased. It is evident, however, that 
settler political conflict during the 1880s and 1890s was endemic. This 
article will examine the causes of the divisions, the structure of political 
parties and factions that emerged among the settlers, and the effects of the 
competition on the settlers' relations with the Kru and the national 
government. 
Causes of Political Competition 
The basic reasons for the intense and long-term political conflict among 
the settlers were economic. Liberia and Sinoe had few resources. Kru illegal 
tra~e and Monrovia's role as the economic center of settler Liberia kept Sinoe 
revenues low. The Sinoe settlers could not compete with the settlements in 
Montserrado County or with the Kru towns on the coast. Although slim progress 
was made in the middle years of the nineteenth century, Sinoe never developed 
an agricultural or commercial base. Throughout Sinoe's history, the Kru were 
more numerous and prosperous; they controlled the economy of the Kru Coast. 
In the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, with a general decline in 
trade in West Africa, Liberia and Sinoe had even fewer economic resources on 
which to depend. This scarcity in the settler community led to conflict over 
trade, land, and the money generated by customs duties and taxes. Control 
over these resources meant control of political office. The few jobs 
available were government positions, but they paid little and sometimes not at 
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all. The Superintendent, Customs Collector, and Sub Treasurer had control 
over what little funds existed; competition for these positions, or influence 
over those who held them, was fierce. 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, foreign loans and wholesale 
disregard of port of entry laws by Africans deprived Liberia of much needed 
revenue. 5 There was little money to go around. In opening the Kru port of 
Nifu to legal trade, President Hilary R.W. Johnson urged the superintendent of 
Sinoe to take care in the collection of revenue, which Liberia direly 
needed. 6 Sinoe had little revenue itself and was in no position to increase 
national revenues. Limited trade and the consequent lack of duties caused 
suffering 
officials. 7 
in Sinoe. This led to little or no pay for most public 
the Sinoe government often operated on As elsewhere in Liberia, 
a day-to-day basis with the assistance of European merchants located there. 
They advanced credit to Liberian politicans which was paid back by deducting 
the amounts from the customs duties owed by those merchants. 8 The Sinoe 
government operated at a loss, because of small revenues to begin with, duties 
not paid by Kru 
embezzlement. 9 
traders and Greenvi 1 le merchants, and because of 
Politics and trade were closely intertwined in Sinoe County. Because of 
their small share of trade, settlers fought for control of what little there 
was. Politicians criticized one another for their involvement in commerce yet 
many individuals and most political leaders participated either directly or 
indirectly in the import/export and retail trade of the region. Political 
leaders were traders from the beginnings of the Greenville colony; by the late 
nineteenth century, almost every leader was a trader, or was employed by one 
as a clerk or attorney. These relationships complicated the political 
competition; accusations of a political nature were really about connnerce, and 
commercial antagonisms were aggravated by political divisions. Those in 
public office who were in trade, sought advantage for themselves and the best 
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interest of their friends and colleagues. The political and commercial ties 
were of several kinds; some politicians were importers and exporters, others 
worked as retailers and collectors of produce for European firms, and men 
trained in law, who also held public office, acted as attorneys for European 
traders. 
Except for work with Europeans, small trade, and farming, the only source 
of income was the government. The rotation of officers in Sinoe was 
frequent. Because the presidential term was two years, appointments in the 
counties were reconsidered every two years. Sinoe politicians rarely lasted 
the possible two years; frequent changes enabled most adult males to have 
their chance at office. 10 To complicate the issue of few paying positions, 
there were few qualified men to fill them. The Sinoe community was small, 
school sessions were erratic, and those trained in law, a preferred 
prerequisite for Liberian politicians, were few • 11 
individuals almost literally exchanged jobs. 
Structure of Sinoe Political Competition 
Competent and powerful 
Competition for land, trade, or political office often centered on 
divisions in the community based on religion, arrival time, and settlement 
pattern. Settlers used alliances of family ties, church membership, and 
settlement pattern to advance their self-interest. 
Families, and those who arrived at the same time who came to be considered 
families, remained political allies for decades • 12 This occurred because 
each succeeding group had to struggle to gain access to the available land, 
few jobs, and little revenue that existed. Earlier, established groups sought 
to keep land, commerce, and political power within their control. 
Church membership became an element in political competition. Churches 
were often completely identified with a particular community -- Methodists in 
Louisiana, Baptists in Lexington and Farmersville, communities adjacent to 
Greenville. 
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Members of the same congregation were potential allies in 
political competition and churches provided a forum for the development of 
leadership and a potential constituency. Not unlike their role in the slave 
communities of the southern United States, Liberian preachers and ministers 
had more education than their contemporaries, they gained leaders hip 
experience in their congregations, and were skilled in oratory. Many of the 
early Sinoe leaders were also ministers. Superintendents, Senators, and 
Representatives held positions of leadership in their churches, frequently as 
pastors. 13 
Reverend James Priest is an excel lent example. An Afro-American 
missionary for the Presbyterian Church, he chose to become a Liberian citizen 
and remain in Liberia. He was elected a Senator from Sinoe County in 1853, 
was nominated for Vice President of Liberia, and later became a judge in 
Greenville. His political activity caused concern among white missionaries, 
but Priest insisted that his religious work did not suffer. Other churchmen 
participated in Sinoe politics, with the support of their mission boards. 14 
The difficulties did not dissuade Priest; politics and preaching became a 
Sinoe and Liberian tradition. 
Location of settlement became a focus of political competition because of 
the primary role of Greenville to the exclusion of the up-river settlements; 
immigrants settled outside Greenville because they preferred farming to 
commerce and because good sites and positions of leadership in Greenville were 
already taken by earlier immigrants. 15 Greenville was more established, 
international connnerce centered there, and most Sinoe politicans came from 
Greenville. Consequently, citizens from the other towns believed that they 
had fewer advantages, economic and political, than their counterparts in 
Greenville. 
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They were essentially correct. Throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, these settlements could not get bridges built from 
Lexington, Bluntsville, and Louisiana to Greenville, although money was 
repeatedly appropriated by the national legislature. 16 When elections were 
contested, the challengers tried to disqualify whole settlements' votes, 
always one of the up-river settlements. 17 Lexington citizens complained 
that jurors from their settlement were not allowed to sit on the grand jury in 
Greenville. 18 Difficulties occasionally led to violence. In 1874 Lexington 
residents attacked people from Farmersville and Greenville and were put down 
by the militia. 19 On other occasions, up-river settlers used less violent 
means to differ with Greenville. Several documents indicate that there were 
years when the settlements such as Louisiana and Farmersville deposited no 
taxes into the county treasury. 20 
Although religion, kinship, and location remained factors in Sinoe 
politics, competition increasingly occurred through political factions. 
Factions, formed around powerful individuals, competed for jobs, revenue, and 
control of trade. Political parties and factions developed early and remained 
strong throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 21 By the 1850s, 
Sinoe individuals were associated the political parties that operated on a 
national scale. 22 As the True Whig Party gained influence nationally at the 
expense of the Republicans, so too in Sinoe the True Whig Pary became 
dominant. The divisions among the settlers did not disappear, however. At 
the end of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth, competition for office 
and influence took place within the True Whig Party (TWP) in the form of 
factions, and between the TWP and smaller opposition parties.23 
9 
Examples of Sinoe Political Competition 
Sinoe politicans competed fiercely for all political offices, but 
legislative offices and County financial positions were the most sought 
after. These positions were signficant because they controlled land, trade, 
and revenues. Politicians coveted legislative positions because they were the 
only elective offices in Sinoe, and therefore had a definite minimum of two 
years' duration. More importantly, it was the legislators who voted on 
national policies that directly affected the Sinoe community. The legislature 
established taxes on property, Kru labor, imports and exports, and regulated 
trade to the advantage of the settlers. In addition, legislators were members 
of the County Superintendent 1 s council and hence had an influence on his 
decisions. 
Consequently, legislative seats were hotly contested and elections were 
challenged frequently. New representatives and senators were challenged by 
their opponents. Politicans tried to disqualify the votes of whole 
settlements, especially the Sinoe up-river towns. 24 Legislative committees 
investigated the challenges and invariably awarded the seats to those 
originally elected. In one case, a minority report concluded that both 
parties were guilty of bribery and corruption and that neither of them 
deserved a seat in the Senate. 25 
The most intense competition was over those positions that involved the 
collection and disbursement of money. 26 The little revenue in the county 
was controlled by the Sub Treasurer and Collector of Customs. They were 
directly responsible to the President through the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Local politicians, however, attempted to influence and control these offices 
whenever possible. Individuals and factions wanted their own people to hold 
those offices. When they did not- succeed, they tried to remove officers 
backed by their political opponents. The following incident, described at 
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length in the Liberian Executive Correspondence, shows the fierce competition 
over the office of Sub Treasurer, the involvement of political factions in the 
control of money, and the tension this caused between the President and Since 
officials. 
The illegal dismissal of Sub Treasurer B.J. Turner in 1894 is the 
Since political incident in the extent Executive best-documented 
Correspondence. Superintendet S.R. Miller dismissed B.J. Turner as Sub 
Treasurer without the prior approval of President Joseph J. Cheeseman. When 
informed of this action, President Cheeseman ordered that Turner be 
immediately reinstated. In his reprimand to Miller, Cheeseman made his 
position on illegal dismissals very clear: "In closing this dispatch I have to 
remind you for your future guide that no Superintendent has any right in law 
to summon the Sub Treasurer before him to make report of his doing. - As you 
have done in Mr. Turner's case. " 27 Liberian presidents repeatedly struggled 
to keep control over money and politicians in Sinoe. 28 
The major elements of the case were the following. The superintendent with 
his council, composed of Since legislators and important citizens, called for 
an audit of the accounts of Sub Treasurer B.J. Turner. He refused to appear 
before them and held onto the money and accounts. When Turner refused to 
appear, Superintendent Miller and his council removed him and appointed 
another man as Sub Treasurer. Turner obtained an injunction against his 
dismissal from Judge R.H. Montgomery, which the council and superintendent 
ignored. 29 
These were the surface issues. Underlying the opposing accusations was a 
struggle over money in an election year. Turner and Judge Montgomery claimed 
that Senator Jacob J. Ross and David W. Frazier had suggested to 
Superintendent Miller that he call the Council and ask that Turner give 
account. Turner and his sympathizers believed that Ross and Frazier were 
afraid that Turner would not give over monies from the treasury for their use 
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during the election. 30 Ross and Frazier maintained that money that should 
have been in the treasury was missing and unaccounted for, and that Turner did 
not own enough personal and real property to be holding public office anyway. 
Because he was not wealthy in his own right, he was more likely to use public 
funds for his own purposes. Ross and Frazier also claimed that W.E. Harris, a 
Turner sympathizer, supported Turner because Harris was Turner's lawyer for 
the case and Harris owed duties for the past year which had not been paid into 
the treasury. 3l A more neutral party, Zachariah C. Roberts, expressed his 
concern about the defiance of proper authority by the Council in summoning 
Turner and ignoring the injunction. He concluded his letter with the post-
script, "the public laughs heartily, looking upon it as a money grab."3 2 
The matter ended in a stalemate. In the course of the dispute, two 
separate groups of citizens petitioned for the removal of both Sub Treasurer 
Turner and Superintendent Miller. 33 Cheeseman ordered Miller to reinstate 
Turner. Then at Miller's own request, Cheeseman removed Miller from office 
and appointed D.W. Frazier as superintendent, 34 
Two aspects of this case are significant. On a local level it exemplified 
numerous other incidents of factions' competition for positions that 
controlled revenue; it was indeed a money grab. In a national context, 
however, Sinoe politicians' efforts to control the Sub Treasurer challenged 
the authority of the President and Monrovia's domination of the counties. It 
was this aspect that Cheeseman focused on, not the issue of Turner's property 
qualifications or the misappropriation of funds. His assertion of executive 
power was paramount in his reprimand to Senator Ross: 11It was not a question 
with me as to the quiet [sic] of Mr. Turner of Official misconduct, but the 
authority of the Superintendent to suspend or dismiss, although advised to do 
so by his Council. n35 
political 
In the face of internal and external economic and 
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pressures, Liberia as a nation could not afford challenges from the ranks of 
the settler community. 
Monrovia I s authority. 
Nevertheless, Sinoe settlers consistently challenged 
The divisions were real and the Sinoe settlers saw 
their interests at odds with Monrovia. 
In addition to the control of revenue, factions in Greenville wanted to 
control the small amount of trade that entered their port legally. Kru and 
Europeans controlled the bulk of external trade on the coast, while Dutch and 
Germans controlled most of the retail business and produce buying in Green-
ville and environs. Several Liberians, such as Jacob J. Ross and J. J. W. 
Johns, were active in local trade. Their political activities, therefore, 
served their economic interests. Economic self-interest often led to conflict 
of interest for Sinoe politicians. 
The most common conflict of interest occurred when individuals who were 
traders held public office. This type of relationship had a tradition in 
Sinoe, and in Liberia. One of the first Senators, Edward Morris, was an 
important businessman in the 1840s and 1850s. Sinoe Superintendent Richard E. 
Murray traded goods for his own benefit and to increase monies available to 
the American Colonization Society for its work in settling new 
immigrants. 36 Evidence from the 1880s and 1890s indicates that this problem 
was constant. Almost every Sub Treasurer and Collector of Customs was accused 
of misusing his position to his own advantage. No sooner had an officer been 
removed than his successor engaged in similar activities to advance the 
commerce of himself and his friends. 37 
A second type of conflict of interest was the involvement of Sinoe 
politicians as advisors and attorneys for foreign nationals trading in 
Greenville. 
attorney. 
W.E. Harris, a trader himself, acted for J.W. West as an 
West was a German who had trading factories along much of the 
Liberian coast. West was accused of violating the port of entry laws by 
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trading along the coast. West through Harris maintained that he did so only 
in the manner of giving credit to Liberians who then traded goods and bought 
produce. Harris claimed that this was common practice on the Kru Coast, 
engaged in as well by the Norwegian and Dutch traders. They, however, were 
able to trade without criticism because their lawyers were important 
politicians: "the County Attorney is yearly lawyer for the Norwegians, and 
Lord Ross, who seems to drive the whole matter, is for the Dutch." 38 This 
was common practice and indicates the close political and commercial 
relationships in Sinoe. In addition to these ties, there simply were few 
attorneys. Those with some law training held public office and had to be 
engaged in court cases involving Liberians and Europeans alike. 
A third aspect of political conflict, in addition to control of revenue 
and trade, was that of land. The exact relationship between politics and land 
is difficult to ascertain. Records of deeds and land transactions indicate 
that politicians obtained plots of land in the outer settlements, probably for 
cash crop farming, and in the city of Greenville. Samuel v. Mitchell, a 
politician and trader in the 1850s, bought and sold many parcels of land in 
Greenville and the up-river settlements. 39 J .J. Ross owned much property 
which he used for his own trading enterprises and leased to European 
traders. 40 Throughout the nineteenth century land was not scarce, although 
good lots in Greenville were. Politicians, through their control of public 
office, had more access to land than the ordinary citizen. On the other hand, 
control of land and choice lots enabled men such as Ross to build up their 
businesses and hence increase their political power. 
Jacob J. Ross is the most significant example of a Sinoe politician in the 
late nineteenth century. Ross was more successful at Sinoe politics than his 
contemporaries and his career illustrates the characteristics of Sinoe 
political competition. Ross formed a prominent political faction in the late 
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nineteenth century with his allies and manipulated neutral and enemy 
politicians when he could. He struggled to control the appointment of 
superintendents and county financial officers and to control the disbursement 
of money through them. As the largest settler trader in Sinoe, he sought 
legislative office and the control of politicians who regulated commerce. He 
controlled large amounts of land in Greenville and maintained ties to European 
traders. Although Ross was a Republican, he never openly opposed the national 
True Whig Party, but defied presidents over Sinoe issues. 
sought to keep his own Republican faction in office in Sinoe. 
He consistently 
Ross survived many Liberian administrations because of his local and 
national power. Some of the strongest language ever used for or against Sinoe 
politicians was leveled at Ross. In spite of accusations he held on to office 
and rose to the positions of Attorney General of Liberia and Vice President. 
Ross was never punished or reprimanded harshly by Monrovia; Liberian 
presidents dealt with him deferentially. He was economically powerful and had 
close ties to Europeans. 41 
Ross' s varied career in Liberia began in 1849. Ross came to Liberia on 
board the Huma, with others who later became prominent Sinoe officials. He 
emigrated from Augusta, Georgia, with his grandmother Hannah Mallory; he was 
eight years old at the time. They settled in Greenville. During his lifetime 
he held most political offices, with the exception of President of Liberia. 
He served as judge in Sinoe, superintendent thrJe times, Senator from Sinoe, 
and as Vice President under William D. Coleman from 1896 to 1899, when he 
died. 42 As a young man, he traded in the interior of Greenville, where he 
learned to speak Kru. Throughout his political career he was a trader and a 
businessman. He owned land in Greenville, had his own wharf, rented lots to 
European traders, and acted as their attorney in litigation. 43 His 
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experience, business acumen, wealth, contacts, and knowledge of Kru affairs 
enabled him to control the small settler economy of Sinoe.44 
Throughout his adult life, Ross was the center of the most powerful 
faction in Sinoe. Although he remained a Republican, he did not oppose True 
Whig Party presidents, but acted out his politics of opposition on the local 
level. During the 1880s and 1890s, Ross attempted to control jobs, revenue, 
and trade in Greenville. He urged the removal of the Collector of Customs 
L.C. Sherman in 1884, tried to prevent German trader J.W. West from coastal 
trading in 1892, and pressed for the dismissal of Sub Treasurer B.J. Turner in 
1894. Whether in or out of office himself, he influenced county politics. 
The following quote by R.H. Montgomery, usually a neutral politician, is 
typical, and mild compared to some of the criticisms of Ross's power: 
••• there are few men who desire to control the whole 
County. That is this they want every office to be 
influenced directly by him. I mean Hon. Senator Ross. 
The entire appointment now is directly under his dictation 
and those few that he cannot influence he will try to have 
them removed from office if he can and no doubt he has 
already applied for my suspension.45 
The charges leveled against Ross were not different from complaints against 
Sinoe politicians in general, but the frequency and the vehemence of the 
letters, and his continued favor with presidential administrations, indicate 
his control of Sinoe and influence in Liberia. 
His national influence is evident in his attitude toward Liberian 
presidents. His acquaintance with Monrovia politics and individual presidents 
led Ross to challenge presidential decisions. In a local dispute over the 
removal of officers in 1892, he emphatically told President Cheeseman to stay 
out of Sinoe politics: 
If you will just keep out and off - and let us arrange our 
local politics - express your regret, but don't commit any 
act that may be interpreted the "President is with us" 
that would cause the breach to be unhealable and we cannot 
tell where it would end •••• I repeat most assuredly - Keep 
out of it, and this schism will die its own death -- It 
can't stand above and live; It will melt away as snow in a 
hot summer day when the proper time comes! As elsewhere 
all dangers in Sinoe are not death, we know each other -
leave us to ourselves.46 
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This strong statement is all the more aggressive in the context of other 
letters from Sinoe to Liberian presidents. In all the Sinoe correspondence, 
whether the writers agreed or disagreed with the presidents, no individuals 
ever took such a tone of criticism and challenge. Usually the least infringe-
ment on presidential authority was reprimanded by Monrovia. 47 There is no 
record of a harsh reply from Cheeseman to Ross, who was never removed from 
office. Ross exemplified Sinoe political competition for meager resources and 
Sinoe's traditional defiance of Monrovia. 
Effects of Political Competition 
Political in-fighting among the Sinoe settlers affected their relations 
with the central government at Monrovia and with their Kru neighbors. 
Preoccupation with internal political differences strained relations with 
Monrovia and prevented united action in dealing with the peoples of the Kru 
Coast. 
Relations between the Sinoe settlers and Monrovia were poor during the 
second half of the nineteenth century, but the most common note in 
presidential correspondence was exasperation: "a large share of my time is 
taken up in getting rid of the old and appointing of new officers for 
Sinoe."4 8 
The difficulties between the presidents and the settlers were primarily of 
four kinds: over the assertion of presidential power and privilege, over the 
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removal of officers because of corruption, disapproval of Sinoe politics in 
general, and the effects that Sinoe politics would have on relations with the 
Kru. 
The frequent removal of Sinoe officers caused friction with Monrovia. As 
presidential appointees, most political officers could only be removed by the 
president. When superintendents and legislators fired officers without the 
president's prior approval, which occurred often in Sinoe, the presidents 
asserted their appointive privilege. On such occasions, both presidents 
Hilary R.W. 
illegally. 49 
Johnson and J.J. Cheeseman reinstated officers removed 
Liberian presidents did, however, dismiss their share of Sinoe officers. 
It was difficult for Sinoe officers to stay in office for a full term. Many 
officers not removed illegally by their opponents in Sinoe were dismissed by 
presidential order. When J.J. Ross complained about the dismissal of officers 
in 1892, Cheeseman reminded him that it was nothing new: "Perhaps you have 
forgotten that several officers were dismissed in like manner in 1885 and 89 
in Sinoe, when you say 'we have never had such wholesale dismissing of 
officers by no President. ,,,5Q 
By the 1890s difficulties in other parts of Liberia and on the Kru Coast 
brought strong disapproval and dissatisfaction with the continued bickering in 
Sinoe. Almost every letter from Cheeseman to Sinoe during the 1890s expressed 
frustration with their preoccupation with local squabbles. Sl Events on the 
Kru Coast and the survival of the Sinoe community and of Liberia demanded 
cooperation and unity among the outnumbered settlers. 
The most crucial effect, therefore, of settler political competition was 
on relations with Kru. Intense competition within the Sinoe community 
prevented their unity, diverted energies that could have been used to improve 
relations with their neighbors, and in some cases actually worsened the 
18 
settler-Kru political situation. Presidents urged again and again that Sinoe 
politicians come together to solve their political and economic difficulties 
with the Kru: 11I am of the opinion that the precarious condition of affairs 
in Sinoe, make it absolutely necessary that the officials and leading men of 
Sinoe should lay aside their political differences and work together in 
harmony for the peace and safety of your County. 1152 They did not heed the 
president's advice and consequently could not negotiate successfully with the 
Kru. 53 In spite of the dangers of large-scale conflict with the Kru, 
settler in-fighting continued, with accusations and aggravation of Kru 
difficulties. 54 
Kru towns were aware of the divisions within the settler community and 
sometimes waited to negotiate in order to gain advantage: 11 And as to the 
natives, they are waiting for the change and hence nothing positive can be 
gotten from them. 1155 If the Kru knew the changing state of affairs due to 
political competition, as it appears they did, it was to their advantage to 
wait a few months to deal with a more sympathetic administration or to avoid 
having a new administration change policies. 
On some occasions, especially when events reached a crisis, Since politi-
cians could get together to plan joint actions. Just as settler expansion and 
aggression could unite the Kru temporarily, fear of a Kru uprising or united 
attack could cause Sinoe politicians to submerge their difficulties. In 1895 
Superintendent S.S. Raynes wrote of such unity to President Cheeseman: 
I noted your kind and very good advice in regards to the 
differences between Mr. Ross and myself - as soon as 
govern- ment matters were entrusted to me, I saw fit to do 
away with private pique - notwithstanding the repeated 
annoy- ances which I am suffering from him. Viewing the 
state of the County, I am under necessity to avoid 
resentment.56 
This attitude is further substantiated, at least for the latter part of 1895, 
by correspondence from Sinoe expressing fear of a Kru rebellion. The signers 
of a letter of Cheeseman included members of several different factions who 
had previously opposed one another.5 7 
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Political rivalry could also directly aggravate relations with the Kru. 
Individual's actions caused crises or worsened relations with Greenville I s 
neighbors. Settler abuse of Kru workers and theft of Kru wages occurred 
frequently. 58 An example of this type of abuse was an action of Samuel A. 
Ross in 1896. Aware of fighting between Blue Barre and Wor, two Kru groups 
east of Greenville, Ross tried to threaten some Wor workers. He told them he 
would deliver them to their enemies, the Blue Barre, if they did not give him 
their belongings and money. The Wor were one of the settlers' only allies and 
Ross's actions damaged relations between them and the settlers. 59 
In addition to conflicts between individuals and groups on the Kru Coast, 
some politicians used difficulties with the Kru to their own advantage. For 
some this meant manipulating settler-Kru difficulties for the benefit of an 
individual settler. In 1896, Colonel W.E. Harris objected to the treatment of 
the Nommo people who lived on the left bank of the Sinoe River, opposite 
Bluntsville, by Superintendent S.S. Raynes and soldiers who fired on Nommo 
houses. Raynes in turn accused Harris of protecting his own property and 
cattle under the pretext of concern for the Nommo. Both accusations were 
manifestations of an internal settler faction quarrel. 60 These political 
conflicts continued throughout nineteenth and twentieth century crises, and 
prolonged the settlement of difficulties on the Kru Coast.6 1 
Conclusion 
Political competition within the Sinoe settler community was strong and 
became a local tradition. The major reasons for the conflict were economic: 
lack of resources, few sources of income, limited agriculture, the small scale 
of trade, and Kru and European control of the coastal economy. Individual 
factions struggled for political power and control of the meager financial 
resources. This competition kept the settlers divided for most of the 
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nineteenth century, including during most, if not all, of their crises with 
the Kru. The long-standing division prevented the settlers from resolving 
difficulties with the Kru and strained relations with the central government 
at Monrovia. As the West African and Liberian economies entered the 
depression of the 1880s, political conflict within the settler community and 
between the settlers and the Kru intensified and led to hostility and open 
warfare in the 1890s and the early decades of the twentieth century. 
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